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The Factors that Explain the Circumstances Under Which U.N. Security Council Member States Authorize Robust Peacekeeping

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This study examines factors that explain circumstances under which the United Nations Security Council member states authorize robust peacekeeping. This research delves deeper into robust peacekeeping than related literature by examining the effect of multiple factors on mandate authorization. Those factors include media attention, spillover effect, type of conflict, economic interest, and the existence of a prior mission. These factors are measured in two missions: the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (UNMEE). A comparative-case approach is used to contrast the circumstances of the robust UNAMSIL and the traditional UNMEE peacekeeping missions. This study makes two hypotheses: (1) The Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when a conflict is intrastate, rather than interstate, and if the conflict shows the possibility of spillover; and (2) The Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when there is increased media coverage in the two years leading up to the authorization of a mission and when previous United Nations involvement has taken place in the conflict or area. The data collected supported the first hypothesis presented, but the data did not hold up against the second hypothesis because the information on media attention was deemed inconclusive. A more thorough search of the data on media attention and the analysis of more cases of past and current peacekeeping missions could offer more concrete answers into the questions posed by this research.


In situations when opposing parties are in a dispute and struggling to engage in peaceful relations, the Charter of the United Nations (UN; Charter) gives member states of the Security Council the power to review the issue and possibly send peacekeepers to maintain or to reestablish peaceful relations (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Traditional peacekeeping missions involve the use of peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions as a way to observe the progress of ceasefire and peace agreements. Certain conflicts, such as the one in Rwanda during the 1990s, provided evidence that traditional intervention lacked efficacy. This caused the UN to alter the nature of peacekeeping. In response to the futility of peacekeeping operations in the face of extremely violent conflicts, especially against unarmed, innocent civilians, the UN heard the call for peacekeeping to include the use of force for the protection of those civilians. Peacekeeping that is more involved and includes the protection of civilians in its mandate is known as robust peacekeeping. Determining which conflicts require robust peacekeeping can, however,



be a difficult task. The literature on this topic often focuses on why peacekeeping is necessary, how it can be improved, and why robust peacekeeping is essential, but it does not specifically focus on which factors or combination of factors lead the Security Council to authorize robust peacekeeping. A host of factors may be involved including the changing interests of the member nations, the degree of media attention, and the concern about whether a conflict could spread or spillover to other nations. In this study, I investigate these factors in relation to Security Council decisions to authorize both a robust peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and a traditional mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).

The UN has been referred to as a “reach beyond existing political boundaries to build on the orderly, brotherly, and cooperative side of human nature” because it is an intergovernmental organization (IGO) whose mission is to promote and enhance peaceful and secure relations between nations (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano 2005, p. 8). The UN has also been called “the answer to a world torn by license and anarchy and ravaged by the excesses of aggressive, self-centered national states” (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano 2005, p. 1). Essentially, the UN consists of 193 member states and it has four main purposes: (1) to maintain international peace and security and to restore breaches of the peace by both lawful and peaceful means, (2) to develop friendly relations among nations and reinforce the institution of peace, (3) to attain international cohesion in the resolution of conflicts of economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and (4) to achieve a center to harmonize the dealings of nations (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano, 2005; United Nations, 1945, Article 1).


The creation of the UN faced many challenges. Constructing an IGO with the capacity to maintain peace and security as well as respect the sovereignty of the involved nations proved to be a difficult process. Many see the organization of independent national entities as unnatural because of states’ legal rights to sovereignty, which would indubitably be limited by the manifestation of the UN or a similar organization (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano, 2005). In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points provided the framework for an intergovernmental organization that focused on peace and security and served as an essential part of the Treaty of Versailles. The goals of Wilson’s speech were to reinstate security, peace, and confidence in democracy at the end of the chaos of World War I (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano, 2005). Wilson’s fourteenth point was that “a general association of nations must be formed under published covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small powers alike” (Ziring, Riggs, & Plano, 2005, p. 14). The first body created using Wilson’s ideas was the League of Nations. Although many consider the League a failure



because it did not prevent World War II, it did, however, succeed in creating an international court and its main organs were successfully implemented into the current structure of the UN (Henig, 2010, p. 4). The precedence of the League's structure allowed the ideas of both international democratic systems and President Wilson to evolve into the present-day international organization that is the United Nations (Henig, 2010, p. 4; Ziring, Riggs, & Plano 2005, p. 14).

Since October 24th, 1945, the UN has worked to fulfill its purposes through its main bodies on projects to the preserve international peace and security, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance (United Nations, 1945). The UN also works on a variety of fundamental issues, including, refugee protection, counter terrorism, disarmament, encouragement of democracy, human rights, and governmental improvement. There are six main bodies, or organs, of which the UN is composed - the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat (United Nations, 1945). The Security Council is the primary organ of the UN that is responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. As such, the Security Council has the power to authorize peacekeeping operations in order to settle disputes between states, a practice that is the focus of this paper (United Nations, 2001). The SC is made up of fifteen nations, five permanent members and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms (United Nations, 2001, para 1-4). While each of the six organs of the United Nations play very important roles in UN proceedings, the Security Council holds a special position in terms of international peace and security because it is the UN body with the power to investigate, give recommendations to settle disputes, and enact mandates- the text or document drawn up by the Security Council that details the resolution to the conflict or dispute of interest- for the maintenance of peace and security (United Nations, 1945).


Under the provisions of the Charter, the Security Council is given specific powers in order to carry out its duties. Chapter six of the Charter states that the Security Council has the power to investigate issues or disputes that could lead to international unrest and determine whether or not those problems could jeopardize international peace and security (United Nations, 1945). These issues can be presented to the Council by both members and non-members of the UN, with certain stipulations for non-member states. A dispute is brought to the attention of the Security Council after measures are taken to settle the dispute through a variety of peaceful means at the discretion of the involved countries, but were deemed ineffective (United Nations, 1945). Subsequent to the investigation of the conflict, the Security Council may use its power to adopt measures by which the dispute can be settled according to the severity of the



conflict. This process describes how the Security Council can enact mandates, usually with full consent of the parties involved, that include the possible use of military force at various levels based on the seriousness of the conflict or dispute with the goal of offering control and resolve to the areas of interest and the parties involved. Operations governed by such mandates are known as peacekeeping missions or operations. Peacekeeping is a very fluid practice in that it is interpreted within loose guidelines to fit different situations; this quality can lead to difficulty in defining exactly what peacekeeping is. Kaufman defines peacekeeping as “the nonviolent use of third-party armed forces to maintain peace among belligerents” (Kaufman, 1996, p. 231). Jakobsen uses Paul Deihl’s definition of peacekeeping: “any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes” (Jakobsen, 1996, p. 218). This study uses Goulding’s (1993) definition of peacekeeping, which he defines as an effort established by bodies of the UN that uses force in order to keep a peace between or within disputing nations that give consent for the peacekeepers to be in place. While peacekeeping is attributed with certain elements such as the maintenance of peaceful relations between states, every operation does not and cannot fit the same mold for the sake of efficacy and efficiency. Over time, as the types and complexity of conflicts have evolved, peacekeeping has had to evolve, as well.


The first official UN peacekeeping operation was the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This mission used observation to report on breaches to ceasefire and armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors (United Nations Department of Public Information, 2011, p. 65). The operation was began in May of 1948 and remains in existence. The mandate for the UNTSO peacekeeping mission describes a type of peacekeeping that can be termed ‘traditional peacekeeping’, which involves activities such as the monitoring of ceasefires and creating a peaceful environment in which political negotiation can take place (Goulding, 1993). Peacekeepers involved in traditional peacekeeping, also referred to as ‘first-generation peacekeeping’, typically function to monitor borders and establish buffer zones and are either lightly armed or carry no arms at all (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2008). They fulfill three main roles: (1) fair witnesses, or observers and reporters of occurrences, (2) referees of peace agreements without the power to enforce them, and (3) serves as police enforcing agreements through the use of force as found necessary (Durch & England, 2009).

For a time, this level of peacekeeping was effective, but as disputes became more complex and as rebel groups within nations began to grow into organized armies, a change in peacekeeping practices



became necessary (Durch & England, 2009). For example, in the Republic of the Congo during the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC - 1960 to 1964), the Security Council realized that peacekeepers would be unable to achieve the mission's objectives (Goulding, 2001). As a result, a sort of peace-enforcement emerged to end the succession of the Katanga province, causing an end to the conflict at that time (Goulding, 2001). The emphasis of the Cold War must be viewed in the context of the need for increased powers of peacekeepers (Durch & England, 2009; Sherman & Tortolani, 2009). Before the end of Cold War in 1990, the usefulness of traditional peacekeeping was evident (Durch & England, 2009; Sherman & Tortolani, 2009). After its end, however, peacekeeping involved less observation and interstate conflict resolution and increased military, civilian, and peacebuilding elements (Durch & England, 2009; Sherman & Tortolani, 2009). This new idea of peacekeeping calls for more security, civilian protection, and political goals and has been referred to as "the joining of peacekeeping with peacebuilding", "second-generation peacekeeping", and "multidimensional peacekeeping operations" (Durch & England, 2009, p. 41; Ramsbotham, et al., 2008, p. 134-135; Sherman & Tortolani, 2009, p. 14). In this research, such innovative peacekeeping practices are referred to as robust peacekeeping.


During the Cold War, amidst anti-Communism and containment hysteria, disagreeing views of the members on the Security Council made the effective control and resolution of disputes difficult or impossible (Goulding, 2001). As tensions faded with the end of the Cold War, the implementation of robust peacekeeping in situations in which such measures were required began to occur (Durch & England, 2009). The Cold War's end led to the authorization of robust peacekeeping operations becoming the rule rather than the exception (Sherman & Tortolani, 2009). Some scholars accredit the rise in the frequency of robust peacekeeping missions to the resistance of the recurrence of atrocities that occurred during the UN missions in Srebrenica (UNMIBH, 1995) and Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993); the mandates for these missions did not allow the use of robust force even when it became apparent that those measures were necessary (Guéhenno, 2009). The mandates of peacekeeping operations must incorporate the allowance of robust interactions when there are evident violent aggressors and helpless victims of that aggression (Durch & England, 2009). To occur, a mission's mandate must invoke "the enforcement chapter" of the Charter of the United Nations, or Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Durch & England, 2009). Chapter VII vests the power to make the decision to use force in the Security Council (United Nations, 1945). This force can range from the interruption of interstate involvement, or sanctions, to the enforcement of specific peacekeeping goals laid out in the mandate (United Nations, 1945, Article 41&



42). Four robust peacekeeping operations deployed in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), East Timor (UNTAET), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), and Haiti (MINUSTAH) all included Chapter VII in their mandates (Johnstone, 2006). The use of Chapter VII may not be exclusive to robust operations, as some traditional missions, such as in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), mention Chapter VII, as well (Johnstone, 2006, p. 66-69). By the year 2008, more than eighty percent of the UN military force deployed invoked the use of Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Durch & England, 2009).

While the invocation of Chapter VII is one component that often distinguishes between traditional and robust peacekeeping missions, the component that has been found to lead to more successful robust peacekeeping missions is the protection of civilians, also referred to as responsibility to protect, or R2P (Perry, 2011). The mandates for Srebrenica and Rwanda did not allow the peacekeepers to protect civilians harmed in the crossfire; the lack of protection allowed those conflicts to escalate to ethnic cleansing and genocide. Presently, when a state is unable to enforce the universal human rights of its civilians, the “primary goal of robust peacekeeping” becomes the protection of civilians (Guéhenno, 2009; Perry, 2011). Robust operations should be vested with the power to interfere when witnessing violence against civilians, as well as adequate resources to fulfill that mandate (Durch, Holt, Earle & Shanahan, 2003, p. 23). Those resources involve the use of military force with a magnitude that is proportional to the size of the population (Guéhenno, 2009). The level of robustness can be measured nominally by the number of troops deployed in an area in relation to the population per square mile (Gowan & Tortolani, 2008).

Peacekeeping missions, by definition, tend to entail the cooperation of the parties involved in the dispute before the mission is authorized. While these circumstances are most favorable, robust missions, in contrast to traditional missions, typically require explicit challenging of the sovereignty of states, making consent of the state nearly impossible to gain for the purposes of the mission (Guéhenno, 2009). Modern conflicts of UN interest have increasingly involved intrastate disputes, often between rebel groups or rebel groups and the state government. Peace agreements between state and non-state actors in this type of conflict often cannot be assured, can be vague, and may even be violated or withdrawn (Guéhenno, 2009). For these reasons, achieving the consent of all parties in robust operations may not be possible and has come to pale in comparison to other necessary components of robust operations during the authorization of peacekeeping missions.




Reviews of the current literature on the characteristics of robust peacekeeping can lead one to question how robust peacekeeping missions obtain authorization. It is fact that the UN Security Council has the power to authorize peacekeeping missions, but how do they decide which operations will have robust mandates and which operations will be mandated with traditional goals and practices? What characteristics cause the members of the Security Council to see a need for robust mandates in some conflicts, while others are authorized with traditional provisions? While scholars often analyze the efficacy of peacekeeping, its evolution, especially since the end of the Cold War, and its effects on the society in which it is implemented, current research fails to offer information on how SC member states the severity of different conflicts. Could the length of the conflict be a contributing factor? Does greater attention by the media influence these decisions? Do member states see the possibility of the spread of the conflict as a great threat? This study aspires to offer insight on these questions and analyze factors for traditional and robust peacekeeping authorization. This research serves to explore which factors explain the circumstances under which UN Security Council member states authorize robust peacekeeping.

Method

The goal of this research is to provide insight on which factors explain the circumstances under which UN Security Council member states authorize robust peacekeeping. First, a working definition was developed in order to differentiate between robust and traditional operations for this study. Using the relevant literature and the characteristics of peacekeeping operations, I developed the following definitions: (1) A robust peacekeeping operation is here defined as one that is authorized after the end of the Cold War and includes the use of military force in an effort to offer control and resolve to a conflict whose mandate concurrently invokes Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations *and* the protection of civilian populations, requires a lesser or lack of a need for consent for action by nations involved, and authorizes the deployment of at least 10,000 troops, police, and UN civilian personnel. (2) Traditional peacekeeping missions are those that were typically authorized during the Cold War, use military force for the observation of peace and ceasefire agreements, whose mandate does not invoke Chapter VII or require the protection of civilians, involves the consent of the parties involved, and authorizes the deployment of less than 10,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel.

The independent variables, or factors, that were chosen to measure their impact on the authorization of robust peacekeeping missions are were chosen based on their emphasis in relevant literature. First, the variable, or factor, that I chose for this study was prior UN involvement. If the UN was



previously involved in a conflict in a certain area and the need for involvement in the same conflict arose once more, the need for more force, or robust authorization, might be seen by the member states of the Security Council. The second variable chosen was media attention and its effect of robust authorization. Jakobsen describes how pressure from the media incites government action in the face of conflict, a response termed the “CNN effect” (1996, p. 206). Chapman and Reiter recognize that media coverage works to “rally” up public interest which in turn, demands the attention of political figures (2004, p. 886-888). This characterized effect of media attention makes this a prominent variable for authorization.

The third factor that was chosen was the type of conflict: interstate, between two or more states, or intrastate, between two or more parties within one state. The type of conflict in which peacekeeping practices has been involved in the past were primarily of interstate interest (Fortna, 2004). Since the end of the Cold War, however, peacekeeping has had to adapt to practices necessary for intervention in intrastate conflict or civil war (Fortna, 2004). Fortna (2003) says that the international community has experienced greater success with peacekeeping in conflicts between states rather than conflict within a single state, meaning that there is a call for improvement. This call for improvement could serve as the driving force for the authorization of robust missions, making this second variable of great interest for this study.


Spillover, or the spread of conflict to nearby areas, has been shown to be a real concern for peace and security. This was the fourth and final independent variable chosen for this study. The existence of intrastate conflict has been shown to increase the chance that neighboring states will experience the conflict, as well (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006).

Given this information on the independent variables that were chosen and the relevant literature, I developed the following hypotheses for this study:

(H1) The UN Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when a conflict is one of intrastate interest, rather than interstate, and if the conflict shows the possibility of spillover.


2) The UN Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when there is increased media coverage in the two years leading up to the authorization of a mission and when previous UN involvement has taken place in the conflict or area.

For this research I used a comparative-case-based approach. I chose the robust United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for comparison to the traditional United Nations Mission in Ethiopia



and Eritrea (UNMEE). I chose these two cases because both the UNAMSIL and UNMEE peacekeeping operations were established after the Cold War and within the same period of time, making the conditions on the basis of time very similar. UNAMSIL was established on October 22nd, 1999 and UNMEE was established on September 15th, 2000 (Nations, 2005; Nations, 2009). According to the definition of robust peacekeeping developed for this research, UNAMSIL adheres to the criteria for a robust mission: its mandate invokes Chapter VII of the Charter *and* the protection of civilians, it did not require the consent of the parties involved, and the operation involved the deployment of greater than 10,000 troops, police, and UN civilian personnel (Nations, 2005). UNMEE, on the other hand, fits the definition for traditional peacekeeping, despite of the fact that its mandate mentioned Chapter VII of the UN Charter; its mandate did not currently note the responsibility to protect civilians (Nations, 2009). The conditions for both missions were similar in ways that allowed for some control of the conditions of the missions, but they also contrasted in ways that made the two cases good choices for this study.

The four variables were measured, or “operationalized” in ways appropriate for both the cases and variables. Two of the independent variables were easily measured: the type of conflict and the existence of a prior mission. The type of conflict can either be classified as an issue between two or more nations or as a civil dispute. Whether or not prior UN involvement or observer missions were authorized to monitor the disputes in Sierra Leone and in Ethiopia and Eritrea can be determined by checking the list for all peacekeeping missions that have been authorized. Media attention was measured by collecting data from the New York Times articles archives two years before the authorization. The New York Times newspaper was chosen because New York is the location of the headquarters of the UN and because of the prominence of the newspaper, meaning that the likelihood that ambassadors and leaders that have influence over the decisions for the Security Council would be likely to read this paper. The dates for which data was taken were October 22, 1997 to October 22, 1999 for UNAMSIL and September 15, 1998 to September 15, 2000 for UNMEE. This two-year period accounts for any lag time that could have occurred in the decision-making process at this time. Searches of key phrases in the New York Times Archives database were performed to collect data. The phrases for UNAMSIL were “Sierra Leone”, “Sierra Leone” + “intervention”, and “Sierra Leone” + “United Nations”; the phrases for UNMEE were “Ethiopia” + “Eritrea”, “Ethiopia” + “Eritrea” + “intervention”, and “Ethiopia” + “Eritrea” + “United Nations”. The last factor, spillover, was measured by reviewing data on refugee flows from the area of the conflict to nearby



states. This data derived from the database of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and was taken the year before authorization and the year of authorization.

Results and Analysis

Prior UN Mission

In July of 1998, the UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (Nations 2000). UNOMSIL, a traditional peacekeeping mission, was in effect until its termination on October 22nd, 1999, which also serves as the date of the establishment of the robust UNAMSIL. UNMEE did not follow any prior UN mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, nor did it lead to the authorization of a robust peacekeeping mission. H2 posits that the presence of a prior UN mission in combination with increased media attention before authorization will lead to a robust mission. This data supports part of H2 being that the authorization of the robust UNAMSIL occurred after its traditional mission, UNOMSIL, ended, while UNMEE was not authorized subsequent to any prior UN mission had taken place in that area.

Type of Conflict

UNAMSIL was a conflict of intrastate interest. Former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, formed an alliance with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel militia in Sierra Leone, to incite the forceful overthrowing of the Sierra Leonean government (Howard, 2002, p. 303-306). Although Taylor was the Liberian president at the time, the fighting was not between Sierra Leonean and Liberian armies, but between two forces within Sierra Leone. In contrast, UNMEE involved border disputes between forces within the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and within the State of Eritrea. Ethiopia and Eritrea were (and still are) two separate entities and the conflict was, therefore, one of interstate interest.

Media Attention

In Figure 1, the data taken from hits of key phrases from the New York Times Archives two years before the authorization of UNAMSIL shows an influx in articles related to the peacekeeping operation in February of 1998, from December 1998 to February 1999, and in July and August of 1999. The data on the mentions of the conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea in Figure 2 shows a spike in coverage in February of 1999 and a very large spike from May to June of 2000. In comparison, Figure 1 shows that the conflict in Sierra Leone shows a higher frequency of mentions over the two years than that of the conflict in Ethiopia and Eritrea, but the second spike for Ethiopia and Eritrea in Figure 2 is higher than any increase

in mentions for the Sierra Leone conflict. The results are inconclusive and do not support or negate H2, but could be conclusive if the mentioned articles are further explored to discover the content of the stories and which stories get repeated.

Figure 1





Figure 2



Spillover

Tables 1-3 show the actual numerical data that was derived from the UNHCR site. Table 1 shows statistical data for the refugee flows a year before and the year of authorization. In 1998, the number that fled the nation accounted for 9.34 percent of their total population. The figure more than doubled in 1999. Table 2 shows that the majority of Sierra Leoneans fled to neighboring Guinea and Liberia. In both Ethiopia and Eritrea, the majority of refugees fled to Sudan and in both countries the numbers of refugee flows dropped from 1999 to 2000 (see Tables 2 & 3). These data support H1 because the refugee flows increased from one year to the next in Sierra Leone, while Ethiopia and Eritrea, the refugees flows decreased drastically, making the possibility of spillover less likely in the latter countries.

Table 1 Percentage of displaced population before authorization

	1998	1999
Sierra Leone	9.34	22
	1999	2000
Ethiopia	0.075	0.065
Eritrea	9.2	0.065

Note: Data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011)

Table 2 Country to which Sierra Leones fled

Country	1998	1999
Angola	1	2
Benin	0	1
Botswana	1	2
Burundi	0	1
Central African Republic	6	2
Chad	1	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1,596	1,773
Egypt	32	129
Gabon	6	55
Gambia	5,419	12,044
Ghana	758	1,694
Guinea	297,231	370,631
Guinea-Bissau	423	595
Liberia	96,273	96,273
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	10	2
Malawi	0	1
Mali	1,222	1,311
Mauritania	17	221
Namibia	1	7
Niger	3	12
Nigeria	1,195	1,702
Senegal	209	255
Swaziland	2	2
Zimbabwe	18	25
Total	404,424	486,741
Total Population	4,332,000	4,419,000

Note: Data taken from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011)


Table 3 Country to which Ethiopians fled

Country	1999	2000
Benin	11	15
Botswana	2	6
Burundi	2	4
Côte d'Ivoire	16	13
Djibouti	1,582	1,508
Egypt	56	54
Gambia	4	
Ghana	6	6
Kenya	8,191	4,053
Liberia	4	4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	0	0
Madagascar	0	5
Malawi	2	0
Morocco	0	9
Mozambique	0	0
Namibia	1	0
Rwanda	2	0
Senegal	1	1
Somalia	130	555
South Africa	4	4
Sudan	35,396	34,132
Swaziland	29	23
Uganda	190	208
Zimbabwe	120	96
Total	45,749	40,696
Total Population	61,095,000	62,565,000

Note: Data taken from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2011)

Discussion

This study used a comparative-case approach on the UN peacekeeping missions UNAMSIL and UNMEE in order to deduce which factors contribute to the decisions of UN Security Council member states to authorize robust peacekeeping. The dependent variable of this study is the authorization of robust peacekeeping, while the independent variables chosen were media attention, prior UN involvement in the area and/or conflict, spillover, and type of conflict- intrastate vs. interstate. This study hypothesized that (1) the UN Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when a conflict is one of intrastate interest, rather than interstate, and if the conflict shows the possibility of



spillover; and (2) the UN Security Council is more likely to authorize robust peacekeeping when there is increased media coverage in the two years leading up to the authorization of a mission and when previous UN involvement has taken place in the conflict or area.

The first hypothesis (H1) was supported by the data. UNAMSIL was the robust peacekeeping operation chosen in the comparative-case approach and it was an intrastate, or civil, conflict while UNMEE, the traditional case, was interstate, or between two separate nations. The data on spillover, which was measure by refugee flows during the conflict, also support H1 in that the number of refugees fleeing from the conflicts in Sierra Leone accounted for a greater percentage of their total population over the two years than that of the refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The second hypothesis (H2) was only supported by one of the variables. The presence of UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone before the establishment of UNAMSIL supported the notion that prior UN involvement would make robust authorization more likely. In the case of media, however, the data was inconclusive and cannot yet be said to support H1 until the stories mentioned from searched of the New York Times Archives are thoroughly analyzed for content and repetition.

The use of a comparative-case study offers insight on the topic, but the results could be deemed inconclusive because of the limited sample size. In the future, the expansion of the case studies to include all peacekeeping missions authorized by the Security Council would be ideal. Also, expanding the measurement of the variables to a more inclusive method could offer more effective data. For media attention, the stories that came up from searches of key phrases could be analyzed for content and repetition in order to determine whether or not it holds greater merit in robust rather than traditional or all peacekeeping missions.

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